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1 Appendix F applies the results in Section 2 of the main paper to the analysis of individual decision making, looking at random utility models of multinomial choice in the presence of interval regressors data. In the models that we analyzed in Section 3 and in Appendix C below, the conditional moment inequalities are of the ≤ type, and
1 Specifically, we illustrate this by looking at games where rationality of level 1 is the solution concept (a problem first studied by Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) ) and by looking at games where correlated equilibrium is the solution concept. 2 We are grateful to Xiaoxia Shi for several discussions that helped us develop this section.
Notice that E[h(Q θ u)|x] is a known (or simulated) function of θ, u, andx and that for each u ∈ B we have only one inequality. Notice also that by the positive homogeneity of the support function, our moment inequalities can be written equivalently as E(m(y x θ g u)) ≤ 0 for all g ∈ G and u ∈ S ≡ {u ∈ κ Y : u = 1} Hence, they are invariant to rescaling of the moment function, which is important for finite sample inference (see, e.g., Andrews and Soares (2010) ).
In all that follows, to simplify the exposition, we abstract from the choice of G Once we establish that our problem fits into the general framework of AS, we can choose instruments g as detailed in Section 3 of AS. To avoid ambiguity, in this section we denote F(y|x) ≡ [P(y = t k |x) k = 1 κ Y ]. We first establish that Θ I can be equivalently defined using only the first κ Y − 1 entries of Y thereby avoiding the problems for inference associated with linear dependence among the entries of F(y|x) and also lowering the dimension over which the maximization is performed. Let 
= Θ I
PROOF: The equality between the two representations above follows by standard arguments; see, for example, Beresteanu and Molinari (2008, Lemma A.1) . To establish thatΘ I = Θ I , observe that θ ∈Θ I if and only if F(y|x) ∈ E(Q θ |x). Pick θ ∈ Θ I Then F(y|x) = E(q|x) for some q ∈ Sel(Q θ ) Notice that this implies F(y|x) = E(q|x) forq ∈ (Q θ ); hence, θ ∈Θ I Conversely, pick θ ∈Θ I Then F(y|x) = E(q|x) for someq ∈ Sel(Q θ ) which in turn implies that q = [q; 1 − κ Y −1 k=1q ] ∈ Sel(Q θ ) and F(y|x) = E(q|x); hence, θ ∈ Θ I
Q.E.D.
AS proposed a confidence set with nominal value 1 − α for the true parameter vector as CS n = {θ ∈ Θ : T n (θ) ≤ c n 1−α (θ)} where T n (θ) is a test statistic and c n 1−α (θ) is a corresponding critical value for a test with nominal significance level α. AS established that, under certain assumptions, this confidence set has correct uniform asymptotic size. 3 To apply the construction in AS, we maintain the following assumption: ASSUMPTION B.1: The researcher observes an i.i.d. sequence of equilibrium outcomes and observable payoff shifters {y i x i } n i=1 DefineΣx = diag( F(y|x)) − F(y|x) F(y|x) and letΣx be nonsingular with a < Σ¯x < b,x-a.s. for some constants 0 < a < b < ∞ where Σ¯x is a matrix norm forΣx compatible with the Euclidean norm.
AS proposed various criterion functions T n : some of the Cramér-von Mises type, some of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov type. Here, we work with a mix of Cramér-von Mises and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic using a modification of the function S 1 on page 10 of AS. Specifically, we use
where Γ denotes a probability measure on G whose support is G as detailed in Section 3 of AS, the second equality follows from the proof of Theorem B.1, andm
3 Imbens and Manski (2004) discussed the difference between confidence sets that uniformly cover the true parameter vector with a prespecified asymptotic probability, and confidence sets that uniformly cover Θ I (see also Stoye (2009) ). Providing methodologies to obtain asymptotically valid confidence sets of either type when the conditioning variables have a continuous distribution is a developing area of research, to which the method of AS belongs. In certain empirically relevant models (see, for example, Appendix C and Appendix D), the characterization in Theorem 2.1 yields a finite number of (conditional) moment inequalities. In such cases, the methods of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) and Romano and Shaikh (2010) can be applied after discretizing the conditioning variables to obtain confidence sets which cover Θ I with a prespecified asymptotic probability, uniformly in the case of Romano and Shaikh (2010) . Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) verified the required regularity conditions for finite games of complete information. so thatm n (θ g u) is the sample analog of a version of E(m(y x θ g u)), which is based on the first κ Y − 1 entries of Y and onQ θ . Note that by the same argument which follows, our problem specified as in equation (3.6) corresponds to the Cramér-von Mises test statistic of AS, with modified function S 1 .
Below we show that our modified function S 1 satisfies Assumptions S1-S4 of AS and that Assumption M2 of AS is also satisfied. This establishes that their generalized moment selection procedure with infinitely many conditional moment inequalities is applicable. We note that one can take the confidence set CS n applied with confidence level 1/2 to obtain half-median-unbiased estimated sets; see AS and Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2009) . Finally, one can also take the criterion function in Theorem B.1, replace there F(y|x) with its sample analog, and construct a Hausdorff-consistent estimator of Θ I using the methodology proposed by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007, equation (3.2) and Theorem 3.1). To see that their results are applicable, recall that the payoff functions are assumed to be continuous in (x j ε j ). Hence, the Nash equilibrium correspondence has a closed graph; see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Section 1.3.2) . This implies that Q θ has a closed graph and, therefore, the same is true for E(Q θ |x); see Aumann (1965, Corollary 5.2) . In turn, this yields lim sup θn→θ E(Q θn |x) ⊆ E(Q θ |x) Observe that
The criterion function s(θ) ≡ d H ( F(y|x) E(Q θ |x)) dFx with Fx the probability distribution ofx (or a probability measure which dominates it), is therefore lower semicontinuous in θ because lim inf
Conditions (c)-(e) in Assumption C1 of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) are verified by standard arguments.
We now verify AS's assumptions. THEOREM B.2: Let Assumption B.1 hold. Then Assumptions S1-S4 and M2 of AS are satisfied.
PROOF: Assumption S1(a) follows because the moment inequalities are defined for u ∈ S κ Y −1 ; hence any rescaling of the moment function is absorbed by a corresponding rescaling in u The rest of Assumption S1 and Assumptions S2-S4 are verified by AS. To verify Assumption M2, observe that
is given by the sum of a linear function of u and a Lipschitz function of u with Lipschitz constant equal to 1. It is immediate that the processes {u w(y in ) u ∈ S κ Y −1 i ≤ n n ≥ 1} satisfy Assumption M2. We now show that the same holds for the processes {f (
where the first inequality follows from the variance decomposition formula, c is a constant that depends on a and b from Assumption B.1, and the last inequality follows by recalling thatQ θ takes its realizations in the unit simplex which is a subset of the unit ball. Assumption M2(b) follows immediately because the envelope function is a constant. Assumption M2(c) is verified by observing that f (x θ u) is Lipschitz in u with Lipschitz constant equal to 1. By Lemma 2.13 in Pakes and Pollard (1989) , the class of functions {f (· u) u ∈ S κ Y −1 } is Euclidean with envelope equal to a constant and, therefore, is manageable. Assumption M2 for the processes {(u w(y in ) − f (x in θ n u)) u ∈ S κ Y −1 i ≤ n n ≥ 1} then follows by Lemma E1 of AS.
B.2. BLP With Interval Outcome and Covariate Data
We maintain the following assumption:
Let Q θi be the mapping defined as in equation (5.1) using (y iL y iU x iL x iU ). Beresteanu and Molinari (2008, Lemmas A.4 and A.5 , and proof of Theorem 4.2) established that {Q θi } n i=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. random closed sets, such that E( Q θi 2 H ) < ∞ Define T n (θ) similarly to the previous section,
where, again, the fact that u ∈ S guarantees that the above test statistic is invariant to rescaling of the moment function. This preserves concavity of the objective function. We then have the following result: 
Given the above definitions, we have √ nm n (θ u) = ν n (θ u) + γ 1 n (θ u) 
a Gaussian process with mean zero, covariance kernel γ 2 (θ u u * ) and continuous sample paths. It follows from the strong law of large numbers in Banach spaces of Mourier (1955) that the sample analog estimatorγ 2 n (θ u u * ) which replaces population moments with sample averages, satisfiesγ 2 n (θ · ·)
APPENDIX C: ENTRY GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
We now consider the case that players have incomplete information (see, e.g. Aradillas-López (2010), Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2007) , Seim (2006) , Sweeting (2009) ). We retain the notation introduced in the main paper, but we substitute for Assumption 3.1 the following assumption, which is fairly standard in the literature. We continue to maintain Assumption 3.2. (ii) All players and the researcher observe payoff shifters x j j = 1 J The payoff shifter ε j is private information to player j = 1 J and unobservable to the researcher. Conditional on {x j j = 1 J} ε j is independent of {ε i } i =j Players have correct common prior F θ (ε|x) (iii) The payoffs are additively separable in ε : π j (y j y −j x j ε j ; θ) =π j (y j y −j x j ; θ) + ε j Assumption 3.1(iii) holds.
The independence condition in Assumption C.1(iii) substantially simplifies the task of calculating the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE). Conceptually, however, our methodology applies also when players' types are correlated. The resulting difficulties associated with calculating the set of BNE are to be faced with any methodology for inference in this class of games. The correctcommon-prior condition in Assumption C.1(iii) can be relaxed, but we maintain it here for simplicity.
For the sake of brevity, we restrict attention to two player entry games. However, this restriction is not necessary. Our results easily extend, with appropriate modifications to the notation and the definition of the set of pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria, to the case of J ≥ 2 players, each with 2 ≤ κ Y j < ∞ strategies. In what follows, we characterize the set of BNE of the game, borrowing from the treatment in Grieco (2009, Section 4) , and then apply our methodology to this set. 4 To conserve space, we do not explicitly verify Assumptions 2.1-2.5. Assumptions 2.1-2.3 follow by similar arguments as in Section 3. Assumptions 2.4 and 2.5 follow by the same construction that we provide at the end of Section 3, replacing equation (3.7) with equation (8) in Grieco (2009, Theorem 4) .
With incomplete information, players' strategies are decision rules y j : E → {0 1} with E the support of ε. The set of outcomes of the game is Y = {(0 0) (1 0) (0 1) (1 1)} Given θ ∈ Θ and a realization ofx and ε j player j enters the market if and only if his expected payoff is nonnegative. Therefore, equilibrium mappings (decision rules) are step functions determined by a threshold: y j (ε j ) = 1(ε j ≥ t j ) j = 1 2 As a result, player j's beliefs about player −j's probability of entry under the common prior assumption is y −j (ε −j ) dF θ (ε −j |x) = 1 − F θ (t −j |x) and, therefore, player j's best response cutoff is
Hence, the set of equilibria can be defined as the set of cutoff rules
Note that the equilibrium thresholds are functions ofx only. The set T θ (x) might contain a finite number of equilibria (e.g., if the common prior is the Normal distribution) or a continuum of equilibria. For ease of notation we write the set T θ (x) and its realizations, respectively, as T θ and T θ (ω) ≡ T θ (x(ω)) ω ∈ Ω For a given realization of the random variables that characterize the model, that is, for given ω ∈ Ω we need to map the set of equilibrium decision rules of each player into outcomes of the game. Consider the realization t(ω) of t ∈ Sel(T θ ) Through the threshold decision rule, such a realization implies the action profile
with Δ 3 the simplex in 4 The vector q(t(ω)) indicates which of the four possible pairs of actions is played with probability 1, when the realization of (x ε) is (x(ω) ε(ω)) and the equilibrium threshold is t(ω) ∈ T θ (x(ω)). Applying this construction to all measurable selections of T θ we construct a random closed set in Δ 3 :
For givenx and θ ∈ Θ define the conditional Aumann expectation
Notice that for a specific selection t ∈ Sel(T θ ) given the independence assumption on ε 1 ε 2 the first entry of the vector E(q(t)|x) is
5 For example, with payoffs linear inx and given by π(y j y −j x ε j ; θ) = y j (y −j θ 1j + x j θ 2j + ε j ), we have that player 1 enters if and only if (
and similarly for other entries of E(q(t)|x) This yields the multinomial distribution over outcome profiles determined by equilibrium threshold t ∈ Sel(T θ ). By the same logic as in Section 3, E(Q θ |x) is the set of probability distributions over action profiles conditional onx which are consistent with the maintained modeling assumptions, that is, with all the model's implications. By the same results that we applied in the main papers, the set E(Q θ |x) is closed and convex.
Observe that regardless of whether T θ contains a finite number of equilibria or a continuum, Q θ can take on only a finite number of realizations that correspond to each of the vertices of Δ 3 , because the vectors q(t) in equation (C.1) collect threshold decision rules. 6 As we show in the proof of Theorem C.1, this implies that E(Q θ |x) is a closed convex polytopex-a.s., fully characterized by a finite number of supporting hyperplanes. In turn, this allows us to characterize Θ I through a finite number of moment inequalities and to compute it using efficient algorithms in linear programming. THEOREM C.1: Let Assumptions C.1 and 3.2 hold. Then
where
By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.1,
It remains to show equivalence of the conditions
By the positive homogeneity of the support function, condition (i) is equivalent
It is obvious that this condition implies condition (ii). To see why condition (ii) implies condition (i), observe that because the set Q θ and the set co[Q θ ] are simple, one can find a finite measurable 6 Hence, the set Q θ is a "simple" random closed set in Δ 3 , in the sense that there exists a finite measurable partition Ω 1 Ω m of Ω and sets
. By the properties of the support function (see Schneider (1993, Theorem 1.7 .5)), 
Q.E.D.
REMARK 1: Grieco (2009) introduced an important model, where each player has a vector of payoff shifters that are unobservable by the researcher. Some of the elements of this vector are private information to the player, while the others are known to all players. Our results in Section 2 apply to this setup as well, by the same arguments as in Section 3 and in this appendix.
REMARK 2: Appendix B verifies the regularity conditions required by AS for models that satisfy Assumptions C.1 and 3.2 under the additional assumption that the researcher observes an i.i.d. sequence of equilibrium outcomes and observable payoff shifters
.
APPENDIX D: PURE STRATEGIES ONLY: FURTHER SIMPLIFICATIONS
We now assume that players in each market do not randomize across their actions. In a finite game, when restricting attention to pure strategies, one necessarily contends with the issue of the possible nonexistence of an equilibrium for certain parameter values θ ∈ Θ and realizations of (x ε) To deal with this problem, one can impose Assumption D.1 below: ASSUMPTION D.1: One of the following statements holds: (i) For a subset of values of θ ∈ Θ which includes the values of θ that have generated the observed outcomes y a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists (x ε)-a.s.
(ii) For each θ ∈ Θ and realizations ofx ε such that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist, S θ (x ε) = vert(Σ(Y)) with vert(·) the vertices of the set in parentheses. Assumption D.1(i) requires an equilibrium always to exist for the values of θ that have generated the observed outcomes y If the model is correctly specified and players in fact follow pure strategy Nash behavior, then this assumption is satisfied. However, the assumption implicitly imposes strong restrictions on the parameter vector θ the payoff functions, and the payoff shiftersx ε On the other hand, Assumption D.1(ii) posits that if the model does not have an equilibrium for a given θ ∈ Θ and realization of (x ε) then the model has no prediction on what should be the action taken by the players, and "anything can happen." In this respect, one may argue that Assumption D.1(ii) is more conservative than Assumption D.1(i). We do not take a stand here on which solution to the existence problem the applied researcher should follow. Either way, the approach that we propose delivers the sharp identification region Θ I , although the set Θ I will differ depending on whether Assumption D.1(i) or D.1(ii) is imposed. Moreover, one may choose not to impose Assumption D.1 at all and to use a different solution concept. In that case as well, as we illustrate in Appendix E, our approach can be applied to characterize the sharp identification region.
When players play only pure strategies, the set S θ takes its realizations as subsets of the vertices of Σ(Y) because each pure strategy Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a degenerate mixed strategy Nash equilibrium placing probability 1 on a specific pure strategy profile. Hence, the realizations of the set Q θ lie in the subsets of the vertices of Δ κ Y −1 EXAMPLE 1: Consider a simple two player entry game similar to the one in Tamer (2003) , omit the covariates, and assume that players' payoffs are given by π j = y j (y −j θ j + ε j ) where y j ∈ {0 1} and θ j < 0 j = 1 2 Assume that players do not randomize across their actions, so that each σ j j = 1 2 can take only values 0 and 1. Figure S .1 plots the set S θ resulting from the possible realizations of ε 1 ε 2 In this case, S θ assumes only five values:
where, in the above expressions, E (· ·) θ denotes a region of values for ε such that the game admits the pair in the superscript as a unique equilibrium and E M θ denotes the region of values for ε such that the game has multiple equilibria. Consequently, also the set Q θ assumes only five values, equal, respectively, to
The random set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium profiles S θ and the random set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes Y θ as a function of ε 1 ε 2 in a two player entry game. In this simple example, the two sets coincide.
Hence, the sets S θ and Q θ are "simple" random closed sets in Σ(Y) and Δ κ Y −1 , respectively. Because the probability space is nonatomic and Q θ is simple, E(Q θ |x) is a closed convex polytope, fully characterized by a finite number of supporting hyperplanes. 
If the probability space has no atoms, then the possible values for p 1 fill in the whole [0 1] segment. Hence, E(Q θ ) is a segment in Δ 3 .
Hence, checking whether P(y|x) ∈ E(Q θ |x) amounts to checking whether a point belongs to a polytope, that is, whether a finite number of moment inequalities holdx-a.s. In Theorem D.1, we show that these inequalities are obtained by checking inequality u P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Q θ u)|x] for the 2 κ Y possible u vectors whose entries are either equal to 0 or to 1. 
The proof follows using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem C.1. In Appendix D.2, we connect this result to a related notion in the theory of random sets-that of a capacity functional (the "probability distribution" of a random closed set)-and we provide an equivalent characterization of the sharpness result which gives further insights into our approach. In Appendix D.2, we provide results that significantly reduce the number of inequalities to be checked, by showing that, depending on the model under consideration, many of the 2 κ Y inequalities in Theorem D.1 are redundant. To conclude this appendix, it is important to discuss why the sharp identification region cannot, in general, be obtained through a finite number of moment inequalities. When players are not allowed to randomize over their actions, the family of possible equilibria is finite. Hence, the range of values that ε takes can be partitioned into areas in which the set of equilibria remains constant, that is, does not depend on ε any longer. However, when players randomize across their actions, in equilibrium they must be indifferent among the actions over which they place positive probability. This implies that there exist regions in the sample space where the equilibrium mixed strategy profiles are a function of ε directly.
7 When the distribution of ε is continuous, Q θ may take a continuum of values as a function of ε and E(Q θ |x) may have infinitely many extreme points. Therefore, one needs an infinite number of moment inequalities to determine whether P(y|x) belongs to it. In this case, the most practical approach to obtain the sharp identification region is by solving the maximization problem in Theorem 3.2.
D.1. Example: Two Type, Four Player Entry Game With Pure Strategies Only
Consider a game where in each market there are four potential entrants, two of each type. The two types differ from each other by their payoff function. This model is an extension of the seminal papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991 ). An empirical application of a version of this model appears in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009, CT henceforth) . We adopt the version of this model described in Berry and Tamer (2007, pp. 84 and 85) , and for illustration purposes we simplify it by omitting the observable payoff shiftersx and by setting to zero the constant in the payoff function.
Let a jm ∈ {0 1} be the strategy of firm j = 1 2 of type m = 1 2. Entry is denoted by a jm = 1 with a jm = 0 denoting staying out. Players j = 1 2 of type 1 7 For example, in the two player entry game in Example 1, for ε ∈ E θ M S θ = {(0 1) ( ε 2 −θ 2 ε 1 −θ 1 ) (1 0)} However, if one restricts players to use pure strategies, then for ε ∈ E θ M S θ = {(0 1) (1 0)} with no additional dependence of the equilibria on ε and type 2 have, respectively, the payoff functions π j1 (a j1 a −j1 a 12 a 22 ε 1 ) = y j1 (θ 11 (a −j1 + a 12 + a 22 ) − ε 1 ) (D.1) π j2 (a j2 a −j2 a 11 a 21 ε 2 ) = a j2 (θ 21 (a 11 + a 21 ) + θ 22 a −j2 − ε 2 ) (D.2)
We assume that θ 11 , θ 21 , and θ 22 are strictly negative and that θ 22 > θ 21 . This means that a type 2 firm is worried more about rivals of type 1 than of rivals of its own type. Since firms of a given type are indistinguishable to the econometrician, the observable outcome is the number of firms of each type which enter the market. Let y 1 = a 11 + a 21 denote the number of entrants of type 1 and let y 2 = a 12 + a 22 denote the number of entrants of type 2 that a firm faces, so that y m ∈ {0 1 2} m = 1 2 Then there are nine possible outcomes to this game, ordered as follows: Y = {(0 0) (0 1) (1 0) (1 1) (2 0) (0 2) (1 2) (2 1) (2 2)} Notice that here players' actions and observable outcomes of the game differ. Figure S .2 plots the outcomes of the game against the realizations of FIGURE S.2.-The random set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes as a function of ε 1 ε 2 in a four player, two type entry game. ε 1 ε 2 . In this case, Q θ takes its realizations in the vertices of Δ 8 For example, for ω : ε 1 (ω) ≥ θ 11 ε 2 (ω) ≥ θ 22 the game has a unique equilibrium outcome, y = (0 0) and Q θ (ω) = {[1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] }; for ω : 2θ 11 ≤ ε 1 (ω) ≤ θ 11 2θ 22 ≤ ε 2 (ω) ≤ θ 22 the game has two equilibrium outcomes, y = (0 1) and y = ( 1 0 Because the set Y has cardinality 9 in principle, there are 2 9 = 512 inequality restrictions to consider, corresponding to each binary vector of length 9. However, the number of inequalities to be checked is significantly smaller. Because we are allowing only pure strategy equilibria, the realizations of any σ ∈ S θ are vectors of 0's and 1's. Hence, for all ω ∈ Ω [q(σ(ω))] k = 1 if 
that is, the set of ω for which S θ admits both t k and t l as equilibria has probability 0. Let u k be a vector with each entry equal to 0 and entry k equal to 1, and similarly for u l Then the inequality
|x] does not add any information beyond that provided by the inequalities u P(y|x) ≤ E[h(Q(S θ ) u)|x]
for u = u k and for u = u l The same reasoning can be extended to tuples of pure strategy equilibria of size up to κ Y Applying this simple reasoning, the sharp identification region that we give in this example is based on 26 inequalities, whereas Θ ABJ O and Θ
CT
O are based, respectively, on 9 and 18 inequalities. Hence, the computational burden is essentially equivalent. is given by the union of the yellow, red, and black segments, and Θ CT O is given by the union of the red and black segments; Θ I is the black segment. Notice that the identification regions are segments because the outcomes (0 0) and (2 2) can only occur as unique equilibrium outcomes, and, therefore, imply two moment equalities which make θ 21 and θ 22 a function of θ 11 While, strictly speaking, the approach in ABJ does not take into account this fact, as it uses only upper bounds on the probabilities that each outcome occurs, it is clear (and indicated in their paper) that one can incorporate equalities into their method. Hence, we also use the equalities on P(y = (0 0)) and P(y = (2 2)) when calculating Θ
ABJ O
We generate the data with θ 11 = −0 15 θ 21 = −0 20 and θ 22 = −0 10, and use a selection mechanism to choose the equilibrium played in the many regions of multiplicity. The resulting observed distribution is P(y) = The width of the bounds on each parameter vector obtained using our method is about 46% of the width obtained using ABJ's method, and about 63% of the width obtained using CT's method.
To further illustrate the computational advantages of our characterization of Θ I in Theorem 3.2, we also recalculated the sharp identification region for this example solving for each candidate θ ∈ Θ the problem max u∈B (u P(y|x) − E[h(Q θ u)|x]), without taking advantage of our knowledge of the structure 
of the game that reduces the number of inequalities to be checked to 26. We modified the simple Nelder-Mead algorithm described in Section 3.4 to apply to a minimization in 9 wrote it as a program in Fortran 90, and compiled and ran it on a Unix machine with a single processor of 3.2 GHz. Our recalculation of Θ I yielded exactly the same result as described above, and checking 10 6 candidate values for θ ∈ Θ took less than 1 minute.
D.2. Dual Characterization of the Sharpness Result in the Pure Strategies Case
For a given realization of (x ε) and value of θ ∈ Θ the set of outcomes generated by pure strategy Nash equilibria 8 is
As we did for S θ we omit the explicit reference to this set's dependence onx and ε. Given Assumption 3.1, one can easily show that Y θ is a random closed set in Y (see Definition A.1). Because the realizations of Y θ are subsets of the finite set Y it immediately follows that Y θ is a random closed set in Y without any requirement on the payoff functions.
The researcher observes the tuple (y x ), and the random set Y θ is a function ofx (and of course ε). Under Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and D.1, and given the covariatesx the observed outcomes y are consistent with the model if and only if there exists at least one θ ∈ Θ such that y(ω) ∈ Y θ (ω),x-a.s. (i.e., y is a selection of Y θ ,x-a.s.; see Definition A.3). A necessary and sufficient condition which guarantees that a random vector (y x ) is a selection of (Y θ ,x) is given by the results of Artstein (1983) , Norberg (1992) , and Molchanov (2005, Theorem 1.2.20 and Section 1.4.8), and amounts 9 to
Restrict the set S θ to be a set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. Then when players' actions and outcomes of the game coincide, Y θ coincides with S θ . However, under the more general assumption that y = g(a), where a ∈ A is a strategy profile and g is an outcome rule, these two sets differ and Y θ (x ε) = y ∈ Y : y = g(a) a ∈ A and π j (a j a −j x j ε j θ) ≥ π j (ã j a −j x j ε j θ) ∀ã j ∈ A j ∀j This inequality can be written as P{y ∈ K|x ∈ L}P{x ∈ L} ≤ P{Y θ ∩ K = ∅|x ∈ L}P{x ∈ L} for all K ⊂ Y and compact sets L ⊂ X such that P{x ∈ L} > 0 and it is satisfied if and only if
Because Y is finite, all its subsets are compact. The functional P{Y θ ∩ K = ∅|x} on the right-hand side of (D .5) 
are said to be, respectively, the capacity functional of Z, the containment functional of Z, and the inclusion functional of Z.
Denoting by K c the complement of the set K the following relationship holds:
EXAMPLE 2: Consider again the simple two player entry game in Example 1. Figure S .1 plots the set Y θ against the realizations of ε 1 ε 2 In this case,
The capacity functional of the remaining subsets of Y can be calculated similarly.
Notice that given equation (D.6), inequalities (D.5) can be equivalently written as
where the subscript Y θ |x denotes that the functional is for the random set Y θ conditional onx We return to this representation of inequalities (D.5) when discussing the relationship between our analysis and that of CT. Clearly, if one considers all K ⊂ Y the left-hand side inequality in (D.7) is superfluous: when the inequalities in (D.7) are used, only subsets K ⊂ Y of cardinality up to half of the cardinality of Y are needed.
We can redefine the identified set of parameters θ as
For comparison purposes, we reformulate the definition of the outer regions given by ABJ and CT, respectively, through the capacity functional and the containment functional: 
For the proof, see Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2008, Theorem 4 .1).
D.3. On the Number of Inequalities to Be Checked in the Pure Strategies Case
As discussed in Appendix D.1, when it is assumed that players play only pure strategies, often there is no need to verify the complete set of 2 κ Y inequalities, because many are redundant. Using the insight in Theorem D.2, one can show that the result in equation (D.3) can be restated using the set Y θ and its capacity functional. In particular, if K 1 and K 2 are two disjoint subsets of Y such that
that is, the set of ω for which Y θ intersects both K 1 and K 2 has probability 0, then the inequality P{y ∈ K 1 ∪ K 2 |x} ≤ P{Y θ ∩ (K 1 ∪ K 2 ) = ∅|x} does not add any information beyond that provided by the inequalities P{y ∈ K 1 |x} ≤ P{Y θ ∩ K 1 = ∅|x} and P{y ∈ K 2 |x} ≤ P{Y θ ∩ K 2 = ∅|x}. Therefore, prior knowledge of some properties of the game can be very helpful in eliminating unnecessary inequalities. For example, in a Bresnahan and Reiss entry model with four players, if the number of entrants is identified, the number of inequalities to be verified reduces from 65,536 to at most 100. Theorem D.3 below gives a general result which may lead to a dramatic reduction in the number of inequalities to be checked. While its proof is simple, this result is conceptually and practically important. 
For the proof, see Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2008, Theorem 5 
.1).
A simple corollary to Theorem D.3, the proof of which is omitted, follows:
COROLLARY D.4: Take θ ∈ Θ, and let Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and D.1 hold.
An implication of this corollary is that in a static entry game with two players in which only pure strategies are played, the outer region proposed by CT coincides with ours and is sharp. 10 In this example,
3) shows that actually the sharp identification region can be obtained by checking only five inequalities which have to hold forx-a.s. and are given by inequalities (D.5) for K = {(0 0)} {(1 0)} {(0 1)} {(1 1)} {(1 0) (0 1)} On the other hand, the example in Section 3.4 shows that CT's approach does not yield the sharp identification region when mixed strategies are allowed for.
When no prior knowledge of the game such as, for example, that required in Theorem D.3 is available, it is still possible to use the insight in equation (D.11) to determine which inequalities yield the sharp identification region, by decomposing Y into subsets such that Y θ does not jointly hit any two of them with positive probability. One may wonder whether, in general, the set of inequalities yielding the sharp identification region is different from the set of inequalities used by ABJ or CT. The following result shows that, in general, the answer to this question is "yes." THEOREM D.5: Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and D.1 hold. Assume that there exists θ ∈ Θ with Y θ = ∅, P-a.s., such that for allx ∈X ⊂ X with P(X ) > 0, there exist t 1 t 2 ∈ Y with These results show that the extra inequalities matter, in general, compared to those used by ABJ, and CT, to fully characterize Y θ and determine if y ∈ Sel(Y θ ). In fact, the assumptions of Theorem D.5(a) are satisfied whenever the model has multiple equilibria with positive probability, which implies that the expected cardinality of Y θ givenx is strictly greater than 1, and it has at least three different equilibria. The assumptions of Theorem D.5(b) are satisfied whenever (a) there are regions of the unobservables of positive probability where two different outcomes can result from equilibrium strategy profiles and (b) the probability that the cardinality of Y θ is greater than 1 exceeds the probability that each of these two outcomes is not a unique equilibrium. It is easy to see that these assumptions are not satisfied in a two player entry game where players are allowed only to play pure strategies, but they are satisfied in the four player, two type game described in Section D.1.
APPENDIX E: EXTENSIONS TO OTHER SOLUTION CONCEPTS
While in Section 3 and Appendix D, we focus on economic models of games in which Nash equilibrium is the solution concept employed, our approach easily applies to other solution concepts. Here we consider the case that players are assumed to be only level-1 rational and the case that they are assumed to play correlated strategies. For simplicity, we exemplify these extensions using a two player simultaneous-move static game of entry with complete information.
E.1. Level-1 Rationality
Suppose that players are only assumed to be level-1 rational. The identification problem under this weaker solution concept was first studied by AradillasLopez and Tamer (2008, AT henceforth) . Let the econometrician observe players' actions. A level-1 rational profile is given by a mixed strategy for each player that is a best response to one of the possible mixed strategies of her opponent. In this case, one can define the θ-dependent set
Omitting the explicit reference to its dependence onx and ε R θ is the set of level-1 rational strategy profiles of the game. By arguments similar to those we used above, this is a random closed set in Σ(Y) Figure S .4 plots this set against the possible realizations of ε 1 ε 2 in a simple two player simultaneous-move, complete information, static game of entry in which players' payoffs are given by π j = y j (y −j θ j + ε j ) y j ∈ {0 1} and θ 1 and θ 2 are assumed to be negative.
The same approach as in Section 3 allows us to obtain the sharp identification region for θ as
x -a.s. with
where [q(σ)] k k = 1 κ Y is defined in Section 3. In our simple example in Figure S .4, with omitted covariates, for any ω ∈ Ω such that ε(ω)
and, therefore, it follows that E(Q(R θ )) is equal to E(Q(R θ )) withR θ restricted to be the set of level-1 rational pure strategies. Hence, by Theorem D.1 below, Θ I can be obtained by checking a finite number of moment inequalities. For the case that ε has a discrete distribution, AT (Section 3.1) suggested to obtain the sharp identification region as the set of parameter values that return value 0 for the objective function of a linear programming problem. For the general case in which ε may have a continuous distribution, AT applied the same insight of CT and characterized an outer identification region through eight moment inequalities similar to those in equation (D.10). One may also extend ABJ's approach to this problem, and obtain a larger outer region through four moment inequalities similar to those in equation (D.9). Our approach, which yields the sharp identification region, in this simple example requires one to check just 14 inequalities.
As shown in AT (Figure 3) , the model with level-1 rationality only places upper bounds on θ 1 and θ 2 . 
E.2. Objective Correlated Equilibria
Suppose that players play correlated equilibria, a notion introduced by Aumann (1974) . A correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as the distribution of play instructions given by some "trusted authority" to the players. Each player is given her instruction privately but does not know the instruction received by others. The distribution of instructions is common knowledge across all players. Then a correlated joint strategy γ ∈ Δ κ Y −1 where Δ κ Y −1 denotes the set of probability distributions on Y is an equilibrium if, conditional on knowing that her own instruction is to play y j each player j has no incentive to deviate to any other strategy y j assuming that the other players follow their own instructions. In this case, one can define the θ-dependent set
Omitting the explicit reference to its dependence onx and ε C θ is the set of correlated equilibrium strategies of the game. By similar arguments as those used before, it is a random closed set in Δ κ Y −1 Notice that C θ is defined by a finite number of linear inequalities on the set Δ κ Y −1 of correlated strategies and, therefore, it is a nonempty polytope. Yang (2008) was the first to use this fact, along with the fact that co[Q(S θ )] ⊂ C θ to develop a computationally easy-toimplement estimator for an outer identification region of θ when the solution concept employed is Nash equilibrium. Here we provide a simple characteriza-FIGURE S.6.-The random set of correlated equilibria as a function of ε 1 ε 2 in a two player entry game. The correlated equilibria γ 1 γ 2 , and γ 3 are defined in Section E.2.
tion of the sharp identification region Θ I when the solution concept employed is objective correlated equilibrium. In particular, the same approach of Section 3 allows us to obtain the sharp identification region for θ as
In our simple two player simultaneous-move, complete information, static game of entry, Y j = {0 1} j = 1 2 Y = {(0 0) (1 0) (0 1) (1 1)} Again omitting the covariates, we assume that players' payoffs are given by π j = y j (y −j θ j + ε j ) where y j ∈ {0 1} and θ j is assumed to be negative (monopoly payoffs are higher than duopoly payoffs), j = 1 2 Figure S .6 plots the set C θ against the possible realizations of ε 1 ε 2 for this example. Notice that for ω ∈ Ω such that ε(ω) / ∈ [0 −θ 1 ] × [0 −θ 2 ] the game is dominance solvable and, therefore, C θ (ω) is given by the singleton Q θ (ω) that results from the unique Nash equilibrium in these regions. For ω ∈ Ω such that ε(ω)
is given by a polytope with five vertices-three of which are implied by Nash equilibria (see Calvó-Armengol (2006) )-and is given by
FIGURE S.7.-Identification regions in a two player entry game with correlated equilibrium as the solution concept.
Also in this case, one can extend the approaches of ABJ and CT to obtain outer regions defined, respectively, by four and eight moment inequalities. is given by the union of the yellow, red, and black areas, and Θ CT O is given by the union of the red and black areas; Θ I is the black region. The data are generated with θ 1 = −1 15 and θ 2 = −1 4 and using a selection mechanism which picks each of outcomes (0 0) and (1 1) for 10% of ω : although the reduction in the size of the identification region is less pronounced than in the case where mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is the solution concept.
APPENDIX F: MULTINOMIAL CHOICE MODELS WITH INTERVAL REGRESSORS DATA
This section of the supplement applies the methodology introduced in Section 2 to provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identification region of the parameters θ that characterize random utility models of multinomial choice when only interval information is available on regressors. In doing so, we extend the seminal contribution of Manski and Tamer (2002) , who considered the same inferential problem in the case of binary choice models. For these models, Manski and Tamer (2002) provided a tractable characterization of the sharp identification region and proposed set estimators which are consistent with respect to the Hausdorff distance. However, their characterization of the sharp identification region does not easily extend to models in which the agents face more than two choices, as we illustrate below.
We assume that an agent chooses an alternative y from a finite choice set C = {0 κ C − 1} to maximize her utility. The agent possesses a vector of socioeconomic characteristics w Each alternative k ∈ C is characterized by an observable vector of attributes z k and an attribute ε k which is observable by the agent but not by the econometrician. The vector (y w {z k ε k } κ C −1 k=0 ) is defined on a nonatomic probability space (Ω F P) The agent is assumed to possess a random utility function of known parametric form.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that the random utility is linear, and that w z k , and ε k k = 0 κ C −1 are all scalars. However, all these assump-tions can be relaxed and are in no way essential for our methodology. We let the random utility be π(k;
For simplicity, we assume that ε k is independently and identically distributed across choices with a continuous distribution function F(ε) that is known. We
k=1 ] ∈ Θ be the vector of parameters of interest, with Θ the parameter space. We denote
k=1 ] Under these assumptions, if the econometrician observes a random sample of choices, socioeconomic characteristics, and alternatives' attributes, the parameter vector θ is point identified.
Here we consider the identification problem that arises when the econometrician observes only realizations of {y z kL z kU w} but not realizations of z k k = 1 κ C − 1 Following Manski and Tamer (2002) , we assume that for each k = 1 κ C − 1 P(z kL ≤ z k ≤ z kU ) = 1 and that δ > 0 We let
w] Incompleteness of the data on z k k = 1 κ C − 1 implies that there are regions of values of the exogenous variables where the econometric model predicts that more than one choice may maximize utility. Therefore, the relationship between the outcome variable of interest and the exogenous variables is a correspondence rather than a function. Hence, the parameters of the utility functions may not be point identified.
In the case of binary choice, Manski and Tamer (2002) established that the sharp identification region for θ is given by Θ I = θ ∈ Θ : P(x 1L θ + ε 1 > 0|x) ≤ P(y = 1|x)
This construction is based on the observation that if the agent chooses alternative 1, this implies that ε 1 > −x 1 θ ≥ −x 1U θ On the other hand, ε 1 > −x 1L θ ≥ −x 1 θ implies that the agent chooses alternative 1.
11 In the case of more than two choices, one may wish to apply a similar insight as in the work of CT and construct the region The lower bound on P(y = m|x) in equation (F.1) is given by the probability that ε falls in the regions where choice m ∈ C is the only optimal alternative. The upper bound is given by the probability that ε falls in the regions where choice m ∈ C is one of the possible optimal alternatives. Similarly to the case of Θ CT O in the finite games analyzed in Section 3, Θ O is just an outer region for θ and is not sharp in general. Appendix D.2 provides further insights to explain the lack of sharpness of Θ O .
12
We begin our treatment of the identification problem by noticing that if x k were observed for each k ∈ C one would conclude that a choice m ∈ C maximizes utility if π(m; x m ε m θ m ) = x m θ m + ε m ≥ x k θ k + ε k = π(k; x k ε k θ k ) ∀k ∈ C k = m Hence, for a given θ ∈ Θ, and realization ofx and ε we can define the θ-dependent set M θ (x ε) = m ∈ C : ∃x m ∈ [x mL x mU ] s.t. ∀k ∈ C k = m (F.2) ∃x k ∈ [x kL x kU ] with x m θ m + ε m ≥ x k θ k + ε k This is the set of choices associated with a specific value of θ and realization ofx and ε which are optimal for some combination of x k ∈ [x kL x kU ] k ∈ C and, therefore, form the set of the model's predictions. As we did in Section 3, we write the set M θ (x ε) and its realizations, respectively, as M θ and M θ (ω) ≡ M θ (x(ω) ε(ω)) omitting the explicit reference tox and ε Because M θ is a subset of a discrete space and any event of the type {m ∈ M θ } can be represented as a combination of measurable events determined by ε k k ∈ C M θ is a random closed set in C; see Definition A.1. We now apply to the random closed set M θ the same logic that we applied to the random closed set S θ in Section 3. The treatment which follows is akin to the treatment of static, simultaneous-move finite games of complete information when players use only pure strategies.
For a given parameter value θ ∈ Θ and realization m(ω) ω ∈ Ω of a selection m ∈ Sel(M θ ) the individual chooses alternative k = 0 κ C − 1 if and only if m(ω) = k Hence, we can use a selection m ∈ Sel(M θ ) to define a random point q(m) whose realizations have coordinates [q(m(ω))] k = 1(m(ω) = k), k = 0 κ C − 1 with 1(·) the indicator function of the event in parentheses. Clearly, the random point q(m) is an element of the unit simplex in the space of dimension κ C , denoted Δ κ C −1 . Because M θ is a random closed set in C 12 Appendix D.2 focuses on the lack of sharpness of Θ CT O in finite games with multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria. The same reasoning applies to the set Θ O in equation (F.1). the set resulting from repeating the above construction for each m ∈ Sel(M θ ) and given by
is a closed random set in Δ κ C −1 . Hence we can define the set E(Q(M θ )|x) = E(q|x) : q ∈ Sel(Q(M θ ))
Because the probability space is nonatomic and the random set Q(M θ ) takes its realizations in a subset of the finite dimensional space κ C the set E(Q(M θ )|x) is a closed convex set forx-a.s. By construction, it is the set of probability distributions over alternatives conditional onx which are consistent with the maintained modeling assumptions, that is, with all the model implications. If the model is correctly specified, there exists at least one value of θ ∈ Θ such that the observed conditional distribution of y givenx P(y|x) is a point in the set E(Q(M θ )|x) forx-a.s., where P(y|x) ≡ [P(y = k|x) k = 0 κ C − 1] Using the same mathematical tools that lead to Theorem 3.2, we obtain that the set of observationally equivalent parameter values which form the sharp identification region is given by Θ I = θ ∈ Θ : max 
